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EXPLORING EU COMPETENCE IN CFSP: LOGIC OR 
CONTRADICTION?
Maja Brkan*
Summary: This paper discusses questions concerning the conferral of 
EU Member States’ competences in foreign affairs to the Union and the 
consequences of such conferral. The importance of this question lies in 
the need for an accurate defi nition of the nature of the CFSP. By show-
ing that the Union possesses genuine competences in the CFSP area, 
and through a defi nition of the characteristics of this type of compe-
tence, it will be demonstrated that the policy has moved beyond mere 
intergovernmental cooperation, and represents an intermediate stage 
between intergovernmentalism and supranationality. In light of the 
practice of targeting individuals by freezing their funds and assets, 
the paper also looks at the broadening of fi rst-pillar competences for 
economic sanctions, and attempts to predict possible developments 
in the CFSP area in the future with regard to the conferral of compe-
tence.
The literature on the CFSP is voluminous and varied in focus. A 
great part of it discusses issues from a political science point of view;1 
the legal literature has only shown an interest in these issues quite re-
cently,2 with some of it assuming an international law3 stance towards 
the CFSP. The specifi city of the CFSP lies in the fact that conducting a 
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1 A few examples are R Reinhardt (ed), Toward Political Union. Planning a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy in the European Community (Westview Press, Boulder 1992); N Winn and 
C Lord, EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation-State. Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Palgrave, New York 2001); M Holland (ed), Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The First Ten Years (2nd edn Continuum, London 2004); S Nut-
tall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, New York 2000); KE Smith, European 
Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Polity Press, Cambridge 2005).
2 This is, however, beginning to change. The most vivid examples are probably RA Wessel, 
The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
1999); P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union. Legal and Constitutional Foun-
dations (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004).
3 See for example M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law Aspects of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’ in M Koskenniemi (ed), International Law Aspects of the European Union 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 19.
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purely legal analysis here is almost impossible without considering its ac-
tual policy and characteristics. Various authors differ greatly as to what 
kind of cooperation the CFSP actually represents, and whether the Union 
possesses genuine competences in this area. In this light, the purpose of 
this paper is a threefold one: fi rst, to discuss and attempt to clarify the 
nature of the CFSP through a bottom-up approach, proceeding from the 
question of a conferral of competence4 in this area; second, to show how, 
in certain cases, fi rst-pillar competences in economic sanctions need to 
be broadened in order to achieve second-pillar objectives; and third, to 
try and predict whether a further conferral of competence will be neces-
sary in order to achieve a more effective CFSP.
The fi rst part of the paper examines questions about whether a con-
ferral of competence in the CFSP area has already taken place, what the 
conditions of such conferral are, and what type of competence, if any, the 
Union has in this area. It further discusses the link-up and interdepend-
ence between fi rst- and second-pillar competences, in particular the use 
of fi rst-pillar competences for the achievement of second-pillar objectives. 
The second part then elaborates on the problem of stretching fi rst-pillar 
competences in trade and foreign policy with the goal of freezing individu-
als’ funds and assets. This question, being more of a Community than a 
Union law matter, is important for issues concerning both the broader 
framework of intertwining the fi rst and second pillars and the prolifera-
tion of second-pillar matters via fi rst-pillar competences. The link be-
tween the fi rst and second parts of this paper is, therefore, an important 
albeit implicit one, since it demonstrates that any shortcoming in the 
amount of competences conferred on the Union in the second pillar must 
be remedied by issuing fi rst pillar acts. Whereas the fi rst two parts of the 
paper examine competence questions as they currently stand, the paper 
concludes by discussing the CFSP’s prospects in light of future conferrals 
of competence in this area. The third and fi nal part thus proposes some 
characteristic features of the CFSP model in the future, in the awareness 
that agreement at the political level and a more coherent political iden-
tity5 among the Member States are preconditions for further integration 
in this area. It considers the question of how much further the confer-
ral of competence in the CFSP area should extend in order to make this 
policy more effective.
4 This term is understood here broadly, as the competence to adopt measures in a particu-
lar area. 
5 On identity in the CFSP, see T Tiilikainen, ‘Does Europe Need a Common Identity? A Com-
ment upon the Core Problems of the CFSP’ in Koskenniemi (n 3) 27.
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1 The CFSP and conferral of competence
It has been suggested in the literature that the terms “conferral” 
or “transfer” of competence are not appropriate for the CFSP, and that 
in this area “we are confronted with newly created competences rather 
than with ‘transferred’ competences”.6 Instead, it has been proposed that 
the framing of the CFSP be regarded as the replacement of national for-
eign policies.7 However, it is diffi cult to see the precise difference between 
transfer or conferral, on the one hand, and the replacement of national 
competences, on the other. Replacement seems to suggest that compe-
tences are, in a given matter, no longer exercised at the national level, 
and to imply the reversibility of this newly-created competence. However, 
as will be shown later, conferral of a competence is, likewise, not precon-
ditioned by its irreversibility. This paper uses the term “conferral” as a 
general term for the conferring of powers on a supranational entity. Such 
an approach is in accordance with the terminology used in the EC Trea-
ty,8 and with the most comprehensive research to date on the conferral of 
powers on international organisations, conducted by Dan Sarooshi,9 who 
uses “conferral” as a general term designating various types of conferral 
of competence.
1.1 Theories on the nature of the Union and their inadequacy
If discussed at all, the question of the conferral of competence in the 
CFSP area is usually dealt with as part of attempts to explain the nature 
of the Union and each of the pillars, using the method of deduction from 
a broader analysis of the nature of the Union and the second pillar to 
a (narrower) inference regarding the conferral of competence. Theories 
explaining the nature of the European Union may be classifi ed in three 
separate categories. Yet it is not in the discrepancies between these dif-
ferent theories that their inadequacy lies, but rather in the common trap 
into which all of them fall. In what follows, the three different categories 
of theories10 explaining the nature of the Union on the continuum of inte-
gration11 are presented, together with a critique of each.
6 Wessel (n 2) 254.
7 Ibid.
8 Art 5(1), art 7(1), art 8, art 9 and art 13 TEC are only a few examples.
9 D Sarooshi, International Organizations and their exercise of Sovereign Powers (Oxford 
University Press, New York 2005).
10 This classifi cation was developed primarily by Birgit Weidel, although I have added certain 
elements. See B Weidel, ‘Regulation or Common Position? The Impact of the Pillar Construc-
tion on the European Union’s External Policy’ in B Weidel and S Griller (eds), External Eco-
nomic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union (Springer, Vienna 2002) 23, 38ff.
11 It is perhaps less appropriate to see them as categories than as a continuum, designating 
different levels of integration. 
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The fi rst category of authors sees the Union as merely providing a 
forum for coordinated cooperation,12 and the second (and third) pillar 
as purely intergovernmental.13 The European Union, according to them, 
does not have legal personality, let alone constitute a legal system. The 
Member States, when they act within the second and third pillars, are not 
acting as members of an organisation, but rather in the capacity of con-
tractual parties, and cooperation within the two pillars is binding solely 
under international law.14 These theories do not assign any importance to 
cross-pillar components of the Union, such as the common institutional 
framework and the principle of coherence among different policies and 
pillars. Consequently, the two intergovernmental pillars do not, in the 
view of these authors, represent any intention of the Member States to 
confer their competences to the EU in the given areas.
The second category of authors comprises theoreticians whose vi-
sion of the Union is as a body distinct from its Member States and the 
Community.15 It could be designated, as Weidel correctly observes, as a 
triangular structure of three different entities: the Community, the Mem-
ber States, and the Union. With regard to the question of the conferral 
of competence, this category has two separate prongs. Advocates of the 
fi rst prong negate the possibility of conferring powers to the Union: the 
Union is a “separate entity of integration and cooperation” which lacks 
competences of its own.16 Proponents of the second claim that a conferral 
of powers to the Union has already taken place, and that the Union is a 
“legal entity with genuine law-making powers”.17
The third vision of the Union comprises theories advocating a unitary 
structure for it.18 The European Union constitutes a single legal system 
12 Weidel (n 10) 38, citing Pechstein and König, Die Europäische Union - die Verträge von 
Maastricht und Amsterdam (Mohr, Tübingen 1998).
13 Koskenniemi (n 3).
14 Koskenniemi (n 3) 30, citing I MacLeod, ID Hendry and S Hyett, The External Relations 
of the European Communities (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 412: “As is well known, CFSP 
‘…remains intergovernmental, subject to international law, not Community law. Its product 
is instruments governed by international law, not Community legislation.’ ” 
15 Weidel (n 10) 40, citing T Heukels and JW de Zwaan, ‘The Confi guration of the European 
Union: Community Dimensions of Institutional Interaction’ in D Curtin and T Heukels 
(eds), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in Honour of Henry G. Scherm-
ers (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1994) 195.
16 Ibid.
17 Weidel (n 10) 44.
18 Developed mainly by von Bogdandy following the Amsterdam Treaty and, in the after-
math of the Maastricht Treaty, by von Bogdandy and Nettesheim. See A von Bogdandy, 
‘The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal 
System’ (1999) 36 CML Rev 887; A von Bogdandy and M Nettesheim, ‘Ex Pluribus Unum: 
Fusion of the European Communities into the European Union’ (1996) 2 European Law 
Journal 267.
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and an has international legal personality. The three pillars are not three 
separate legal systems, but are interconnected and embedded within the 
one system of the Union, forming three subsystems of a single legal sys-
tem with partially specifi c legal instruments and procedures.19 The Com-
munity legal order thus “forms part of the Union’s legal order”.20 Certain 
authors even claim that there has been a “fusion” of different pillars into 
one Union.21 The main arguments in support of this set of theories are 
the single institutional framework of the EU; the fact that the budget is 
used for the whole Union; certain supranational elements in the second 
and third pillar, such as qualifi ed majority voting in CFSP matters or 
preliminary rulings by the Court on police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters; protection of human rights throughout the Union; and 
the requirement of consistency among different subsystems. Authors in 
this category take the view that competences have been conferred to the 
Union.
The different models analysed above certainly have differing points 
of view as to whether a conferral of competence from the Member States 
to the Union has already taken place. Those who consider that the TEU 
did not create a union with the capacity to take legal action are of the 
opinion that no powers have been conferred to the Union, and that the 
second pillar consists of the “concerted exercise of Member States’ com-
petences”.22 On the other hand, there are those who “recognise the Union 
as a legal entity with genuine law-making powers”,23 and those who con-
sider Community competences to be just one type of Union competence, 
such as von Bogdandy, who claims that “the essence of the pillar struc-
ture is nothing but a variation on the allocation of powers amongst the 
institutions”.24
One of the aims of this paper is to pinpoint a common defi ciency 
that all three groups of theories suffer from. When various authors speak 
about the conferral of competence to the Union in the second (and third) 
pillar, and the nature of the Union in connection therewith, they suc-
cumb to what may be termed the fallacy of (reverse) causality. Namely, 
it is erroneous to assume that the question of whether a conferral of 
competence in the second (or third) pillar has taken place should be an-
19 Von Bogdandy (n 18) 887.
20 RA Wessel, ‘The Constitutional Relationship between the European Union and the Euro-
pean Community: Consequences for the Relationship with the Member States’ (2003) Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 9/03 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901-
09.pdf>, iii. 
21 Von Bogdandy and Nettesheim (n 18).
22 Weidel (n 10) 44.
23 Ibid.
24 Von Bogdandy (n 18) 902.
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swered by fi rst defi ning the nature of the Union, and not the other way 
round. Such an approach regards a conferral of competence as the con-
sequence of a certain perception of the Union’s structure, one for which 
the author has decided a priori based not on the conferral of competence, 
but on other elements. In other words, we submit that it is erroneous to 
argue that the conferral of competence is contingent upon what we pre-
liminarily perceive to be the Union’s structure: if we say that its structure 
is X, we establish a conferral of competence, whereas if we perceive its 
structure to be Y, conferral presumably does not take place. An illustra-
tion of this fallacy may be found in the following citation: “If one looks at 
EU law as a single legal system, the discourse of transfer of competences, 
stemming from Van Gend en Loos, may also be appropriate for the sec-
ond (and third) pillar. If, by contrast, one analyses the TEU provisions on 
CFSP through the prism of international law, there may be less scope for 
such a discourse, which is not commonly known in international law.”25 
We claim that such a mode of argumentation confounds the cause with 
the consequence. Of course, on a meta-level it is not contested that par-
ticular perceptions and models of the nature of the Union might have 
particular consequences. From a constitutional point of view, however, 
the conferral of competence should be viewed as a cause for a certain con-
stitutional structure and a certain nature of an entity, rather than their 
consequence. Conferral is one of the factors which determines this struc-
ture, rather than being determined by it; likewise, it directs and shapes a 
perspective on this structure, rather than being directed and shaped by 
one. To put it more bluntly, the question of whether second-pillar com-
petences have been conferred to the Union should be answered prior to 
determining the nature of the second pillar and/or the Union. Instead of 
the deductive approach taken by the authors cited above, an inductive, 
bottom-up approach should be used: the conferral of competence is one 
of the foundations upon which the nature of an organisation should be 
formed. This is, of course, not the only feature that should serve as a ba-
sis for determining the nature of an entity; rather, it is only one of several, 
as has been suggested in a similar argument regarding the third pillar.26 
However, we would argue that it is the most important one.
25 Eeckhout (n 2) 144.
26 Neil Walker seems to suggest that determining whether certain cooperation among the 
Member States is to be designated as “intergovernmental” depends on various factors, one 
of them being the “location of competence (extent of European law-making and executive 
jurisdiction, and whether exclusive or shared)”. Other factors include “right of initiative”, 
“procedure for adoption”, “intensity of measures adopted”, “mode of implementation”, “jus-
ticiability” and “forms of post factum oversight”. See N Walker, ‘In Search of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey’ in N Walker (ed), Europe’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford University Press, New York 2004) 3, 16.
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1.2 Conferral of competence
Setting out to explore the potential conferral of EU competences in 
foreign policy matters requires answers to some preliminary questions. 
First, we must defi ne, in an abstract manner, when a conferral of compe-
tence takes place and what the indicators of such a conferral are. Second, 
within the CFSP framework, we need to determine whether, in light of 
such a defi nition, Member States’ competences in this area have already 
been conferred to the Union, and, if so, to which type of competence a 
CFSP competence belongs.
1.2.1 Defi nition and conditions of conferral
At fi rst sight, the task of specifying the defi nition and conditions of 
a conferral of competence might seem utopian. One immediate argument 
against any such attempt lies in a concrete approach which questions the 
possibility of establishing objective criteria for conferral, casts doubt on 
whether the moment of conferral can be determined in advance and in 
the abstract, and claims that conferral can only be defi ned on a case-by-
case basis and ex post facto. A similar approach is to argue that identical 
criteria for a conferral of competence cannot exist for the fi rst and second 
pillar alike. However, we contend that it is possible to provide directions 
and indications regarding this issue, and to defi ne which attributes must 
necessarily be present in order to establish a conferral of competence. A 
comprehensive theory on this issue with regard to international organisa-
tions in general was developed by Sarooshi.27 This paper takes his theory 
as its basis, while adding certain elements so that it may be applied to 
the CFSP area. Differing conceptions of when a conferral of competence 
takes place are possible; viewed broadly, these are the formal approach 
(express conferral by treaty) and the material approach (voting or insti-
tutional approach).
(1) Formal approach. Sarooshi claims that powers are usually con-
ferred on an organisation by virtue of a constituent treaty.28 To support 
this view, he cites the International Court of Justice’s WHO Advisory 
Opinion,29 in which the Court states that “[t]he powers conferred on inter-
national organisations are normally the subject of an express statement 
in their constitutional instruments”.30 This could be termed the formal 
approach, according to which competences are conferred when so deter-
27 Sarooshi (n 9).
28 Apart from conferrals by constituent treaty, Sarooshi deals with conferrals on an ad hoc 
basis, whereby states conclude a treaty in order to confer powers on an organisation, and 
the organisation is obliged to agree; however, this model cannot be applied to the CFSP.
29 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 64.
30 Ibid para 25.
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mined by a treaty, i.e. when a treaty delimits them in terms of the level of 
the entity to which competences are conferred and the level of the states 
conferring them; or, in other words, when states formally cease to have 
exclusive competence in certain areas. However, this approach fails to 
resolve two problems. First, it cannot be absolute, as implied, judicially-
developed competences represent a necessary corollary to prior treaty-
defi ned ones. Second, this approach does not foresee situations where 
a conferral of powers takes place in an implicit and de facto manner. 
Moreover, Sarooshi does not give an answer to the question of just how 
“express” an express conferral of powers should be. Does this imply the 
use of words such as “conferral”, “delegation”, “transfer”, “competences” 
or “powers”? Is it possible for a treaty not to use these particular terms 
and yet still confer powers to an international organisation?
The WHO Advisory Opinion does indeed recognise the possible exist-
ence of subsidiary competences despite the lack of any express statement 
regarding such competences in the constituent treaties, claiming that 
“the necessities of international life may point to the need for organisa-
tions, in order to achieve their objectives, to possess subsidiary powers 
which are not expressly provided for in the basic instruments which gov-
ern their activities”, and that “it is generally accepted that international 
organisations can exercise such powers, known as ‘implied’ powers”.31 It 
is important, however, not to confound CFSP competences with implied 
powers which are merely subsidiary and corollary to expressly conferred 
powers. CFSP competences are not subsidiary powers, but rather self-
standing and independent of other types of competence. Second-pillar 
competences should, therefore, be strictly delimited from external im-
plied powers in a Community law sense. While Community external im-
plied powers parallel the exercise of internal powers, CFSP competences 
should be treated as a separate category of competence. The WHO Ad-
visory Opinion therefore points to a less formalistic solution, but only 
refers to non-express subsidiary powers.
As already indicated with reference to CFSP competences, some hes-
itation occurs regarding the degree of formalism. On the one hand, if this 
issue is approached in a highly formalistic manner, it could be claimed 
that the TEU does not, in fact, use the express term “conferral of powers” 
and does not defi ne anything explicitly with regard to this matter. The 
TEU states that “the Union shall defi ne and implement a common foreign 
and security policy” (Article 11(1)), but does not specify that this is the 
Union’s competence. A formalistic approach would require the Treaty to 
state explicitly that the Union “shall have the competence” to defi ne and 
implement the CFSP. On the other hand, if “express” conferral is not un-
31 Emphasis added, ibid.
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derstood in such a strict manner, it may be claimed that the TEU clearly 
distinguishes between the Union and its Member States: it is the Union 
that defi nes and implements the CFSP and pursues an external and se-
curity policy (Article 11) and the CFSP objectives (Article 12). Despite the 
fact that there is no mention in the TEU of the Union’s competence, but 
rather only that the Union is to defi ne and implement a common foreign 
and security policy covering all the relevant areas, it should be stressed 
that it is not simply the community of Member States that defi nes and 
implements the CFSP. The Member States are actors who should sup-
port the Union’s foreign and security policy and refrain from actions con-
trary to the interests of the Union (Article 11). We would argue that this 
second, less rigid approach should be adopted. This clear delimitation 
between the Union and its Member States is the fi rst indication and argu-
ment in favour of the thesis that Member States’ competences have been 
conferred to the Union in the CFSP area.
Nevertheless, even if express conferral is interpreted in a very rigid 
manner, so that, based on this criterion, no conferral of competence is 
established, it still might be possible to determine that such a conferral 
has occurred, provided that we do not regard this criterion as the only 
threshold for actual conferral. In other words, the criteria that Sarooshi 
uses for determining the type of competence can also be used to deter-
mine whether a conferral of competence has taken place when a treaty 
contains no express statement regarding the same. Sarooshi speaks of 
three criteria for determining the type of competence: revocability of pow-
ers, control over the exercise of powers, and exclusive or concurrent com-
petence to exercise the conferred powers. The fi rst criterion, revocability 
of powers, cannot be determinative for the issue of conferral, as Sarooshi 
himself states. The most important of the three criteria, for the EU in 
general and the CFSP in particular, is that of control over the exercise of 
powers. Here again, a question arises as to what parameters determine 
the degree of control: is it a type of voting, with the possibility of opting 
out of an act, or another form of loss of control? We submit that, for the 
second pillar, two criteria are crucial for determining a loss of control: 
voting, and the independence of the institution adopting the acts.
(2) Voting approach. The voting approach has two prongs, positive 
and negative. According to the positive voting approach, conferral is said 
to occur when decision-making ceases to be conducted by unanimity, 
regardless of the majority involved. Introduction of any type of majority 
vote, whether by a simple, qualifi ed, or even higher majority, gives rise 
to an autonomous decision on a higher level of authority, implying a 
greater or smaller degree of independence among national positions. The 
negative voting approach suggests that decision-making with unanimity 
does not necessarily mean that competences have not been conferred. 
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It is, for example, not valid to claim that there is no conferral of compe-
tence in areas where the Community decides by unanimity. In 1964, at 
the time of the Costa/ENEL decision, most measures were adopted by 
unanimity,32 yet the Court decided that “the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds 
[…] themselves”.33 Claiming that unanimity voting proves the absence of 
conferral of competence is thus problematic in and of itself, since exclu-
sive application of this approach is insuffi cient to resolve the question of 
whether a conferral has taken place or not. For this reason, the voting 
approach needs to be complemented by another (institutional) approach, 
as elaborated below.
Despite this defi ciency, it should be verifi ed whether current exam-
ples of qualifi ed majority voting (QMV) in the CFSP area suffi ce to estab-
lish a conferral of competence, given the fact that unanimity as a general 
rule for adoption of the CFSP can neither confi rm nor deny conferral. 
QMV in the CFSP is possible only in three instances: (a) when adopting 
joint actions and common positions, or making any other decision based 
on a common strategy; (b) when adopting any decision implementing a 
joint action or common position; and (c) when appointing a special repre-
sentative with a mandate related to particular policy issues.34 With regard 
to situation (a), it should be noted that common strategies are adopted 
by the European Council. Concerning situation (b), it should be borne in 
mind that joint actions and common positions are adopted unanimously 
by the Council, and that QMV for implementing these acts is thus only 
indirect, and depends upon a prior unanimously adopted act. With regard 
to situation (c), the Council may, according to Article 18(5) TEU, appoint 
a special representative with a mandate related to particular policy issues 
whenever it deems this necessary. Special representatives represent the 
EU in confl ict areas and promote EU interests and policies.35 Their ap-
pointment is a decision concerning not the content of a CFSP action, but 
rather the person who will advocate the Union’s interests in third coun-
tries and assist those countries. These three cases of QMV are, therefore, 
insuffi cient to establish a conferral of competence in this area.
32 Unanimity was the predominant voting rule until 1966. See V Miller, ‘The Extension of 
Qualifi ed Majority Voting from the Treaty of Rome to the European Constitution’ (2004) 
Research Paper 04/54 <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rp04-
054.pdf> 3.
33 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585 para 3.
34 Treaty on European Union art 18(5).
35 Examples of special representatives include those for the South Caucasus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Central Asia, Sudan 
and Afghanistan. EU Council Secretariat, Factsheet, ‘EU Special Representatives (EUSRs): 
A voice and face of the EU in crucial areas’ (2005) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cmsUpload/EUSRs.pdf> 1.
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Furthermore, it should be determined whether unanimity voting, 
coupled with constructive abstention, indicates a certain degree of con-
ferral of competence. Bradley and Kelley are of the opinion that this is 
not the case.36 According to them, in order for conferral (which they term 
“international delegation of authority”) to take place, “the state must lack 
full formal control over the decisions or actions of the entity”.37 In their 
view, “full formal control means that no binding decision or action can be 
taken without the affi rmative vote or purposeful abstention of the state 
through a vote”.38 As already stated, we maintain the view that unanim-
ity voting per se cannot exclude the possibility of powers being conferred. 
It may merely indicate a lack of conferral, but does not constitute an 
ultimate proof; instead, this must be proved using other approaches. We 
would, however, agree with the view that the existence of constructive 
abstention does not contribute in any respect to an affi rmative answer as 
regards the conferral of powers. Sarooshi points to a different example: 
when an international organisation adopts binding decisions by a major-
ity vote, and its member states have the right “to contract out of, or make 
reservations to,” this decision before it enters into force, a conferral has 
still taken place.39 This example is inherently different, however, since 
the acts were adopted by a majority vote.
(3) Institutional independence approach. Decisive proof of a conferral 
of powers in the CFSP area can be obtained via the institutional inde-
pendence approach. According to this approach, a conferral of compe-
tence takes place when a decision is made on a higher level by an institu-
tion which is more than just the sum of its members, as in the case of the 
EU and its Member States. This approach builds on the argument that 
the Council is not merely a forum for meetings by the Member States’ 
government representatives, but an institution which, albeit composed 
of member states, is still relatively independent40 of them. The mere fact 
that CFSP acts are adopted within the framework of the Council indicates 
that this is a Union-level competence, and thus that competences are 
not held entirely by the Member States. The nature of the Council as an 
institution cannot be denied, and it would be illogical for it to act as an 
36 CA Bradley and JG Kelley, ‘The Concept of International Delegation’ (2006) Duke Work-




39 Sarooshi (n 9) 59. He states that, in this case, the type of competence conferred is delega-
tion, not transfer. 
40 Although Wessel rejects the use of the concept of “transfer” for the CFSP, he uses the 
criterion of independence when seeking to establish a distinction between an entity and its 
members: “What we look for are the minimum features of an international entity to conclude 
on some degree of independence vis-à-vis its member states”. Wessel (n 2) 254.
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institution when deciding within the Community, but merely as a forum 
for the Member States, who retain their exclusive competence, in matters 
concerning the second pillar. The obvious counterargument is, of course, 
that a fi rst-pillar conferral is not due to decision-making by the Council, 
but rather to other factors, such as QMV, primacy, and the effective en-
forcement of Community measures. We submit, however, that the effect 
or enforcement of a measure should not be confused with the level at 
which it is adopted. These two phenomena are - and should be - separate 
from one another. As far as QMV is concerned, we have seen that it is not 
a suffi cient indicator for whether conferral has taken place. 
Further arguments in line with this approach may be found in the 
TEU itself. The Treaty states that institutions - the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Audi-
tors - shall exercise their powers under the conditions and for the pur-
poses set forth in the two treaties, i.e. the TEC and the TEU (Article 5(1)), 
thus implying that they have powers under the TEU as well. From where 
would they derive these powers if not from a conferral? One frequently 
heard argument in this regard concerns the common institutional frame-
work by which the Union is to be served (Article 3(1)). It would be quite 
illogical for the same institutions, especially the Council, to have compe-
tences pursuant to the EC Treaty, but not the EU Treaty, including the 
CFSP. Using the institutional approach, it may be demonstrated that a 
conferral of competence in the CFSP area has indeed taken place. It is 
important to note that pre-emption or “occupation” of this area is not a 
condition for conferral to occur, as will be explained below.
1.2.2 CFSP competence: a hybrid
Once it has been determined that a conferral has taken place, we 
need to decide which type of competence it should qualify as. It is patent 
that the type of competence found in the CFSP area should be sought 
somewhere on the scale between concurrent41 and complementary com-
petences. We would argue that the current list of three categories of com-
petence - exclusive, concurrent and complementary42 - is not exhaus-
41 One synonym for “concurrent competence” which is sometimes used is “shared compe-
tence”. We would caution against the use of this term, since it is used for different types of 
competence by different authors, and may thus create confusion.
42 A slightly different classifi cation has been proposed by von Bogdandy and Bast, who dis-
tinguish between exclusive and non-exclusive competences and, within the latter category, 
between concurrent, parallel (or shared) and non-regulatory powers, with parallel powers 
having the same content as complementary ones. A von Bogdandy and J Bast, ‘The Euro-
pean Union’s Vertical Order of Competences: The Current Law and Proposals for its Reform’ 
(2002) 39 CML Rev 227, 242.
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tive. Each type of competence implies a different degree of conferral, and 
refl ects different characteristics. For the purpose of contextualising this 
problem, a short excursus on the three current types of competence is 
necessary. As a preliminary, it should be mentioned that the text of the 
EC Treaty distinguishes only between exclusive and non-exclusive com-
petences (Article 5(2) EC). There is no mention of complementary compe-
tences anywhere in the Treaty; yet this category exists, although it is not 
called by that name in the TEC.43
Exclusive competence, as developed by the ECJ and formally in-
troduced into the TEC by the Maastricht Treaty (in what is now Article 
5(2) EC),44 implies that, in an area where the Community has exclusive 
competence, the Member States are not allowed to adopt legislative acts 
or conclude treaties with third countries, regardless of whether such a 
competence has been exercised by the Community or not. Concurrent 
competence implies that the Member States can act in a particular area 
only as long as the Community has not done so; once the EC has adopt-
ed legislation which enjoys primacy over a confl icting national law, the 
Member States are barred from adopting any legislation in the given area. 
This is sometimes also referred to as “occupation” of the area, whereby 
the Member States are prevented from adopting legislation in accordance 
with the principle of “pre-emption”. Complementary competence means 
that the Community has the competence to complement and support the 
Member States’ action in a particular area, while the Member States are 
not barred from exercising their own competence even after the Com-
munity has adopted acts; the exercise of Community competences thus 
does not result in “pre-emption”.45 Examples of such competence in the 
TEC are found in Articles 149, 164 and 157 EC. The fact that the Com-
munity does not occupy the area in question is the main difference from 
concurrent competence. The three current categories of competence do 
not, however, constitute an exhaustive list of the existing competences; 
they are not rigidly defi ned, nor are they the only possible types of compe-
tence. As has already been pointed out elsewhere, “the process of integra-
43 This term came into use during preparations for the Constitutional Treaty. See, for ex-
ample, the ‘Final Report of Working Group V “Complementary Competencies”’ (2002) CONV 
375/1/02, REV 1, WG V 14 <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00375-
r1en2.pdf>. 
44 Formerly art 3b EC.
45 Hable argues that exclusion of pre-emption is the essential dividing line between concur-
rent and complementary competence, although she uses different terminology to designate 
the types of competences. A Hable, ‘The European Constitution: Changes in the Reform of 
Competences with a Particular Focus on the External Dimension’ (2005) Europainstitut, 
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, EI Working Paper Nr. 67 <http://fgr.wu-wien.ac.at/wp/wp67.
pdf>, 12.
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tion does indeed entail the progressive creation of new powers, as well as 
the reorganisation of existing powers at both levels of governance”.46
As a preliminary, it is necessary to defi ne some characteristics of 
the CFSP competence, which is said to be located on the scale between 
concurrent and complementary competence. First, what is actually be-
ing conferred in this type of competence is the competence to decide in 
foreign policy matters. However, such conferral only occurs if there exists 
the political will to do so.47 This is possible because conferral in the CFSP 
area, unlike conferral in the case of concurrent competence, is revers-
ible. A second important characteristic is that measures adopted within 
the CFSP framework do not pre-empt action by the Member States in a 
general way. With regard to the CFSP competence, even if the Union has 
acted in this area it is not occupied by it, and the Member States may 
still act. They are only required not to adopt measures that would confl ict 
with the CFSP measures already adopted. Pre-emption thus does not 
constitute a rule in the CFSP, and this is its main similarity with comple-
mentary competence, where a Community competence can likewise be 
exercised alongside the competence of the Member States.
There has been much confusion among advocates of the view that 
the Union possesses competence in the CFSP area as to what type of 
competence this actually is. Before adoption of the Constitutional Treaty 
(CT), this confusion had literally gone to extremes, with, on the one hand, 
a Praesidium discussion paper claiming that “the powers of the Union in 
the CFSP area are concurrent with those of the Member States”,48 while, 
on the other, a report stated that Union powers in the second pillar were 
“of an overwhelmingly intergovernmental nature”.49 Others argued that 
the CFSP fi t within what they termed “parallel” competences, correspond-
ing contentwise to what were later called complementary competences, 
without giving any further justifi cation or explanation as to why they 
46 I Pernice, ‘Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Controlling the Competencies of the 
Union’ (2001) Walter Hallstein-Institut Paper 6/01 <http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/
english/papers/whipapers601/index.htm> 3.
47 It would be wrong to say that a conferred competence is only exercised when there is 
political will. 
48 Praesidium discussion paper entitled ‘Delimitation of competence between the European 
Union and the Member States - Existing system, problems and avenues to be explored’ 
(2002) CONV 47/02 <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00047en2.pdf> 6.
49 Apart from expressing a point of view, this statement also contains an internal contradic-
tion, for how can a power assigned to a supranational entity (Union) be at the same time 
intergovernmental? Intergovernmentality inherently implies that no power is allocated at 
the supranational level, thus remaining exclusively with states. See European Parliament 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs ‘Report on the division of competences between the 
European Union and the Member States’ (2002) 2001/2024(INI), A5-0133/2002 <http://
european-convention.eu.int/docs/relateddoc/511.pdf> 29.
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belonged in this category.50 Similarly, second-pillar powers were ranked 
among powers for “co-ordination and common action”.51 Contrary to this 
view, there was also the opinion that CFSP powers should actually be 
placed among shared or concurrent powers.52
Following adoption of the Constitutional Treaty, the fog enveloping 
the CFSP competence partially lifted, yet its precise content and scope 
still remain unclear. In Article I-12, the CT differentiates between fi ve 
categories of competence: namely, exclusive competence; shared compe-
tence; coordination of economic and employment policies; competence in 
matters of common foreign and security policy; and supporting, coordi-
nating or complementary action. Many authors commenting on the issue 
of CT competences took the view that the CFSP here was - or had become 
- a “special”, “separate” or “sui generis” type of competence. However, 
there was still a divide between those who willingly accepted it as a cat-
egory separate from the three basic types of competence, and those who 
regarded the creation of a special category of competence as erroneous, 
claiming that it should instead be conceived of as a shared (also termed 
“concurring”) competence, or a special sub-type thereof. Griller, for ex-
ample, adheres to the latter position, stating that, instead of creating a 
special type of competence, the CFSP should have been categorised un-
der shared (concurrent) competences, with the possibility of regulating its 
specifi cities, such as, for example, excluding direct effect and supremacy; 
this he compares to the current Article 34(2)(c) TEU, which excludes di-
rect effect for any other decisions adopted pursuant to the provisions on 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.53 Among advocates 
of the opposing position, Petersmann observes that CFSP competences 
as regulated in the CT represent a “special category of competences sui 
generis […] whose constitutional regulation remains imprecise in many 
ways”.54 Hable speaks of a “separate competence category for the CFSP” 
in the Constitutional Treaty, which allegedly “displays the reluctance to 
apply either of the legal consequences attached to the categories of shared 
competences or the area of supporting, coordinating or complementary 
50 Von Bogdandy and Bast (n 42) 247.
51 Pernice (n 46) 5, 15.
52 B de Witte, ‘Clarifying the Delimitation of Powers - A Proposal with Comments’ in Europe 
2004 Le grand débat. Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options (European Commission, 
Brussels 2002) 121, 129. According to de Witte, competence in defence matters would be a 
complementary competence.
53 S Griller, ‘External Relations’ in B de Witte (ed), Ten Refl ections on the Constitutional 
Treaty for Europe (EUI Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di 
Fiesole 2003) 133, 139ff.
54 E-U Petersmann, ‘A New Constitutional Paradigm?’ in C Gaitanides et al (eds), Europa 
und seine Verfassung (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2005) 176, 184.
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action to the CFSP”.55 Dashwood treats “competence to frame and imple-
ment the CFSP” as a separate category, one “obeying a different logic”.56 
Bermann speaks of the Union’s powers in the CFSP area as not being 
found in any of the three categories (“as if an autonomous category”), yet 
does not explain why they should not actually be viewed as an autono-
mous category.57 Wessel treats this competence as a “CFSP competence”, 
separating it from explicit and implicit external competences.58 All these 
different views show that the CT failed to clarify what characteristics this 
type of competence has, and that the issue of its precise scope and effects 
remains unclear. In any case, the Constitutional Treaty has been buried, 
pending further steps to revive it. The reason for discussing it here is that 
it refl ects the current stage of Union integration and heralds its future 
development. The Treaty’s reference to “competence to defi ne and imple-
ment a common foreign and security policy” leaves us with three possi-
bilities as to what actually occurred in the CT with regard to the CFSP.
The fi rst possibility is that the Constitutional Treaty merely codifi ed 
the current situation in this matter. The CT expressly states that the 
Union has competence in CFSP matters.59 This represents a large step 
with regard to the criterion of express conferral of powers by a constitu-
ent treaty, as discussed above, since conferral as formulated by the CT 
clearly falls within the category of expressly conferred powers. But even 
a less explicit formulation could still signify actual conferral, and it may 
be argued that the CT fi nally made explicit what was already in place. 
The second possibility is that the Constitutional Treaty has taken a deci-
sive step towards fi nally creating CFSP competences on a supranational 
level, in an area where the competence issue was inherently unclear. We 
submit, however, that this is not the case, for the reasons stated above. 
Under the third possibility, it could be argued - although we do not agree 
55 Hable (n 45) 25. Hable argues, on the one hand, that the pre-emption embedded in 
shared competence has discouraged Member States from applying this type of competence 
to the CFSP and, on the other hand, that simple exclusion of pre-emption is not a solution 
either. Further, with regard to categorizing the CFSP as a complementary competence, she 
argues that this would represent “a poor signal on the way to developing a strong CFSP”.
56 A Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/
European Community’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 355, 370.
57 Emphasis added. GA Bermann, ‘Competences of the Union’ in Tridimas and Nebbia (eds), 
EU Law for the 21st Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 
65, 68.
58 RA Wessel, ‘Fragmentation in the Governance of EU External Relations: Legal Institu-
tional Dilemmas and the New Constitution for Europe’ in JW de Zwaan et al (eds), The Euro-
pean Union. An Ongoing Process of Integration. Liber Amicorum Alfred E. Kellermann (T.M.C. 
Asser Press, The Hague 2004) 123, 126. 
59 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe art I-12(4) expressly states: “The Union 
shall have competence to defi ne and implement a common foreign and security policy, in-
cluding the progressive framing of a common defence policy.”
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with this view - that the Constitutional Treaty does not refl ect the real 
situation, that it has not created any special competence, and that, by 
not including the CFSP under any other competence, it only indicates 
that the Member States have retained their competences in this area. 
According to this view, the provisions regarding the Union’s competence 
are merely words on paper. The position advocated in this paper adheres 
to the opinion of several authors who, following adoption of the Consti-
tutional Treaty, advocated the view that the CFSP competence formed a 
separate, sui generis type of Union competence. However, it should be 
emphasised here that a future push towards concurrent competence in 
the CFSP area cannot be excluded. We have designated the CFSP type 
of competence as a convergent competence in order to signify a middle 
phase between exclusive and concurrent competence, one in which the 
Member States strive for a common result or conclusion.60 The term con-
vergent is also more appropriate for indicating the non-reversibility of 
this type of competence, since it does not imply a “sharing” of power as 
the terms “concurrent” or “shared” competence do. The next section of 
this paper deals with the question of why it is important to discuss com-
petence issues in the CFSP area.
1.3 Consequences of the conferral of competence 
A discussion of the type of the CFSP competence should aim at iden-
tifying its consequences for the form of cooperation in CFSP matters and 
the nature of the second pillar. As mentioned at the outset, the exist-
ence and type of a competence is the main indicator of the nature of the 
relationship between the Union and its Member States. The type of this 
competence is, therefore, not a self-contained question; rather, it serves 
as the cause of a certain constitutional structure for CFSP cooperation. 
What follows in this part of the paper is an outline of this structure as 
the consequence of a given type of competence (as its cause). For this 
purpose, several stages in the formation of a political union will be briefl y 
introduced, and the CFSP will be situated among these stages. 
The formation of any union occurs in several stages; a customs and 
monetary union is a typical example of this phenomenon. Similarly, the 
formation of a political union among states does not occur instantane-
ously, but rather is a successive process, where it is not possible to ad-
vance to a later stage without fi rst attaining the previous one. The stages 
of formation of a political union correspond to the degree of competences 
conferred to the supranational level. The scheme presented below builds 
60 One of the meanings of the term “converge” is “to tend toward a common result or conclu-
sion”, as stated in Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (Random House, New York 
1991) 298 under the entry “converge”.
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on the type of competence characteristic of a particular stage of inte-
gration, from which the form of cooperation among member states is 
derived. This method follows the bottom-up approach mentioned at the 
beginning, in order to avoid the fallacy of (reverse) causality.
Table 1: Stages in the formation of a political union61 
Type of competence Stage of 
integration
Form of cooperation
Exclusive competence of 
the actors
Information The actors inform each 
other of the measures they 
are adopting.
Exclusive competence 
of the actors, seeking 
coherence where possible
Consultation The actors inform each 
other of their measures, 
deliberate, and promote 
coherence.
Exclusive competence of 
the actors, but exercised 
with a view to fi nding 
common solutions where 
the political will exists
Coordination The actors are involved in 
multilateral negotiations 
that result in international 
treaties; some of their 
measures are already 
harmonised.
Concurrent competence 
between the actors and 
the supranational level
Harmonisation The next step from 




Unifi cation Replacement of national 
instruments with union 
instruments.
As is readily apparent, the coordination stage does not fully explain 
the status quo of the CFSP, since, as was stated above, the Union already 
possesses competences in this area to a certain degree, and negotiations 
among the Member States do not result in international treaties.62 Those 
who claim that the Member States still remain exclusively competent in 
this area perceive the CFSP as currently being in the coordination stage 
and striving to move towards the harmonisation stage. However, it is dif-
fi cult for them to explain the outcome of negotiations among the Member 
States; the only way that comes to mind is to assert that the results of 
61 This table logically follows from the one in P Grilc, Pravo Evropske unije (Pravna fakulteta 
and Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 2001) 11.
62 This is very well expressed by Wessel, who states: “…CFSP decisions are not to be seen 
as international agreements between […] participating states, but rather as decisions taken 
by an organ of a new legal person composed of member states”. Wessel (n 2) 324.
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negotiations are indeed not international treaties, but acts adopted on the 
basis of an international treaty. This should not, however, be confused 
with the adoption of international treaties themselves.
We would argue, therefore, that the convergent competence es-
tablished above should be added to this table, which would be further 
amended as follows:
Table 2: Stages in the formation of a political union - proposed amend-
ment








the entity and its 
members, still 
exercised only where 
the political will exists
Synchronisation Decisions are made in the 
framework of a pre-established 
institution; the actors refrain 
from any actions that could 
jeopardise the objectives of 
common action.
… Harmonisation …
… Unifi cation …
The table now includes the convergent competence, with the charac-
teristics elaborated above. However, this type of competence yields differ-
ent consequences from those of exclusive competence in the coordination 
stage. Where a convergent competence exists, cooperation among the ac-
tors is no longer intergovernmental, since the entity itself begins to acquire 
a certain degree of independence, albeit still less than in the harmonisa-
tion stage. In the stage which we have termed synchronisation (because 
the members of an entity work together here to synchronise their actions 
and positions), the entity possesses pre-established institutions in whose 
framework decisions are made, and the actors are required to refrain from 
any actions that could jeopardise the objectives of an action adopted at the 
entity level. The synchronisation stage also shows where the CFSP is to 
be situated on the continuum of formation of a political union, and which 
stages it must pass through before full political union is achieved.
2 Horizontal stretching of fi rst-pillar competences
Apart from the vertical conferral of competences, it is important to 
consider the horizontal stretching of fi rst-pillar competences to issues 
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with second-pillar objectives. The convergent competence in the second 
pillar has its limitations, and the competence in economic sanctions is 
encompassed by the fi rst pillar, thus representing an interplay of compe-
tences in economic and foreign policy matters. Therefore, in order to gain 
a clear picture of foreign policy competence issues, it is also necessary 
to touch on recent developments regarding the fi rst-pillar competence in 
economic sanctions.
The issue addressed in this section is the coupling of Article 308 
EC, i.e. the fl exibility clause, with Articles 301 and 60 EC; or, in other 
words, the possibility of applying Article 308 to Community economic 
sanctions. The Court of First Instance faced this legal problem in the 
recent Kadi63and Yusuf64 cases, in which regulations65 implementing Se-
curity Council resolutions66 freezing the funds of individuals and entities 
associated with the Taliban, Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network 
were challenged as ultra vires due to their having been adopted on the 
basis of these three articles. Under the regime currently in force, Article 
308 EC requires that measures adopted based thereon pursue one of the 
objectives of the Community, whereas Articles 60 and 301 EC state that 
the Council may impose urgent measures with regard to the movement 
of capital and payments and interrupt or reduce economic relations as 
regards third countries. The problem that arises in these cases is three-
fold.
The fi rst problem concerns the more general question of simultane-
ous use of Articles 301 and 60, namely, determining whether economic 
sanctions pursue an objective of the Community or the Union. The core 
of this problem is that application of Article 308 to articles on economic 
sanctions adds to the list of objectives defi ned by the EC Treaty as sec-
63 T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005.
64 T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the Eu-
ropean Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 21 September 2005.
65 The fi rst of the Council Regulations (467/2001) was adopted only on the basis of articles 
60 and 301 EC, whereas the second (881/2002) was adopted based on Articles 301, 60 and 
308 EC. The respective Regulations are Council Regulation (EC) 467/2001 of 6 March 2001 
prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the fl ight 
ban and extending the freeze of funds and other fi nancial resources in respect of the Tali-
ban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation (EC) 337/2000 [2001] OJ L67/1, and Council 
Regulation (EC) 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specifi c restrictive measures di-
rected against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda 
network and the Taliban, and repealing Regulation 467/2001 [2002] OJ L139/9. The two 
Council Regulations were amended by nine Commission Regulations: 1354/2001 [2001] 
OJ L182/15, 1996/2001 [2001] OJ L271/21, 2062/2001 [2001] OJ L277/25, 2199/2001 
[2001] OJ L295/16, 2373/2001 [2001] OJ L320/11, 2604/2001 [2001] OJ L345/54, 
65/2002 [2002] OJ L11/3, 105/2002 [2002] OJ L17/52 and 362/2002 [2002] OJ L58/6.
66 UNSC Resolutions 1267(1999), 1333(2000) and 1390(2002).
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ond-pillar objectives. If, however, it were decided that these two articles 
pursue second-pillar objectives, this would actually change the scope 
(and the wording!) of Article 308 EC.67 Second, restricting the movement 
of capital and payments did not concern third countries here, but rather 
a terrorist group (the Taliban) and those associated with it; the second 
question is, therefore, whether economic sanctions can be imposed on 
individuals who are third-country nationals. The third question, which 
arose only in the Yusuf case, is whether such sanctions may be imposed 
not only on third-country individuals, but also on EU citizens allegedly 
connected with such terrorist groups.
It should not be forgotten that all three problems actually stem from 
the fact that these regulations were implementing Security Council reso-
lutions, and that the latter actually dictated the subject and scope of im-
plementation. Thus, although the Union itself decided to implement these 
resolutions, the UN acts infl uenced the scope of the Union’s competence. 
The Union could, however, have taken a different approach, declaring 
that the area regulated by the resolutions exceeded its competence and 
refusing to implement them, thus leaving the task of implementation to 
the Member States. 
2.1 The objective of economic sanctions
With regard to the question of which goals were being pursued by 
the measure, the CFI was faced with a choice among three possible deci-
sions. In the fi rst, the objective of economic sanctions against the Taliban 
becomes a Community objective as a matter of fact once measures pursu-
ant to Articles 301 and 60 EC are adopted. By virtue of the fact that Ar-
ticle 301 EC was included in the EC treaty, a CFSP objective included in 
a common position or joint action on whose basis a fi nal economic sanc-
tions measure is adopted becomes a Community objective as a matter of 
fact when that measure is adopted based on Articles 301 and 60. In the 
same way as the measure is transformed from a second-pillar measure to 
a Community one, the objective underlying it is transformed into a Com-
munity objective. The drawback of this argument is that there is a danger 
of foreign policy objectives becoming Community objectives in general, 
since any objective of an initial measure (common position or joint action) 
could become the objective of a subsequent Community measure.
In the second possibility, economic sanctions against the Taliban are 
said to pursue an objective of the Union manifested through a Community 
measure. This is the approach adopted by the CFI:
67 This is prohibited verbatim by Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I 1759.
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Under Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, action by the Community is there-
fore in actual fact action by the Union, the implementation of which 
fi nds its basis on the Community pillar after the Council has adopt-
ed a common position or a joint action under the CFSP.68
This approach is problematic due to the fact that application of Ar-
ticle 308 EC to articles regulating economic sanctions means not only a 
change and stretching of the latter, but also a change in the wording of 
Article 308 EC which, all at once, concerns not only Community but also 
Union objectives. The difference here from the fi rst approach is that the 
former claims that action by the Community is not, in actual fact, action 
by the Union, but rather that Union objectives have become, in actual 
fact and for the purposes of Articles 60 and 301, objectives of the Com-
munity. The second approach states that these objectives remain Union 
objectives. The Court’s argumentation also reveals a certain vision of the 
Union; namely, the Court sees the Union as an entity separate from the 
Community, not as an entity overarching it, expressly defi ning the Union 
and the Community as “integrated but separate legal orders”.69 In order 
to avoid abuses of Article 308, the Court also stresses that:
…it appears impossible to interpret Article 308 EC as giving the in-
stitutions general authority to use that provision as a basis with a 
view to attaining one of the objectives of the Treaty on European 
Union.70
It is important to stress that the two articles (301 and 60) must 
somehow be fi tted into the framework of the EC Treaty; otherwise, it 
would perhaps be better to leave them out of it altogether.
The third option for the CFI was to argue that Article 308 cannot be 
applied to Community economic sanctions at all, and that such acts are 
always ultra vires. The Court would thus adopt a formalistic approach, 
thereby stating that any application of Article 308 EC to Community eco-
nomic sanctions would amount to an ultra vires measure. This last ap-
proach arguably best conforms, in a literal sense, to Opinion 2/94, in 
which the Court determined that Article 308 “cannot serve as a basis for 
widening the scope of Community powers beyond the general framework 
created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in particular, 
by those that defi ne the tasks and the activities of the Community”.71 
However, such an approach would be too rigid and would not refl ect 
real-world requirements and demands, according to which states cannot 
be seen as the only source of security threats, given the fact that terror-
68 Kadi (n 63) para 125.
69 Ibid para 120.
70 Emphasis added, ibid. 
71 Opinion 2/94 (n 67) para 30.
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ist groups cannot be limited to the territory of one or several states, and 
may even lack a specifi c connection to a particular state. In practice, it 
would mean that the Union would not have the competence to implement 
any SC resolutions requiring it to go beyond the text of Articles 301 and 
60. This would exclude implementation of any “smart sanctions” target-
ing individuals, the use of which has increased over the past decade.72 It 
must also be recognised that, at the time when Articles 301 and 60 EC 
were framed, all potential sources of security threats had probably not 
even been anticipated, and smart sanctions were not common practice. 
These two articles were introduced into the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as 
Articles 228a and 73g EC, at a time when smart sanctions were only be-
ing developed. In this regard, it was logical for the possibility of sanctions 
against individuals not to be included in the Treaty’s text at that time. 
As will be seen below, the Constitutional Treaty aimed to encompass this 
development by including the possibility of targeting individuals.
2.2 Sanctions against third-country individuals
With regard to whether economic sanctions can be imposed not only 
against third countries, but also against individuals from third countries, 
it may, in our view, successfully be argued that an interpretation of Ar-
ticles 301 and 60 covering third-country individuals can be fi tted into 
the “framework of the Treaty”.73 It must be borne in mind that the reality 
of international threats has changed since these two articles were intro-
duced into the EC Treaty. Such threats are posed not only by states, but 
also by organisations originating in a particular country but not neces-
sarily connected with it, or even independent of any country. The reason 
why Articles 301 and 60 refer only to third states is that, at the time of 
their framing, threats extending beyond national borders were not par-
ticularly imminent.
Such an interpretation is also in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitutional Treaty, which is an important indicator and herald 
of the (necessary) development of legislation in this direction. Article III-
322(2) CT,74 which, if the Constitutional Treaty were ratifi ed, would re-
place Article 301, stipulates in its second paragraph that the Council 
may “adopt restrictive measures […] against natural or legal persons and 
72 On smart sanctions see, for example, D Cortright and GA Lopez (eds), Smart Sanctions. 
Targeting Economic Statecraft (Rowman and Littlefi eld Publishers, Lanham 2002) and the 
literature cited therein.
73 Opinion 2/94 (n 67).
74 For a comment on this article in connection with the Court’s jurisdiction, see T Tridimas, 
‘The ECJ and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court of the Union?’ in Tridimas and 
Nebbia (n 57) 128. See also R Smits, ‘The European Constitution and EMU: An Appraisal’ 
(2005) 42 CML Rev 425, 437ff.
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non State groups or bodies” where a European-level decision provides for 
such measures. Article III-160(1) CT, which would replace Article 60 EC, 
states the following: “[A]s regards preventing and combating terrorism 
and related activities, European laws shall defi ne a framework for ad-
ministrative measures with regard to capital movements and payments, 
such as the freezing of funds, fi nancial assets or economic gains belong-
ing to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non state 
entities”. Naturally, the CT provisions should not be used to interpret the 
provisions of the existing Treaties; nonetheless, they show in which di-
rection the CFSP ought to develop should it be ratifi ed by all the Member 
States.
2.3 Sanctions against EU citizens
The question of the permissibility of imposing sanctions against EU 
citizens arose in the Yusuf75 case, where the applicant, Ahmed Ali Yusuf, 
was a Swedish national, and the other applicant, Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation, an economic entity established in Sweden. The CFI 
did not enter into a broader discussion of this issue, but simply relied 
on the effectiveness argument, determining that Articles 60 and 301 EC 
would not be effective unless it were also possible to adopt measures 
“against individuals who, although not resident in the third country in 
question, are suffi ciently connected to the regime against which the sanc-
tions are directed”.76 The CFI then addressed the specifi c situation of EU 
citizens by merely stating that “the fact that some of those individuals 
so targeted happen to be nationals of a Member State is irrelevant, for, 
if they are to be effective in the context of the free movement of capital, 
fi nancial sanctions cannot be confi ned solely to nationals of the third 
country concerned”.77
The decision to implement Security Council resolutions at the Un-
ion level, and not leave it to the individual Member States, constitutes a 
double stretching of Community competence. On the one hand, it allows 
75 Two other Swedish citizens, Abdi Abdulaziz Ali and Adirisak Aden, were removed from 
the list of persons subject to the freezing of funds. This was done due to a decision by the 
Sanctions Committee and, subsequently, at the Community level by Commission Regulati-
on (EC) 1580/2002 of 4 September 2002 amending for the second time Council Regulation 
(EC) 881/2002 imposing certain specifi c restrictive measures directed against certain per-
sons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 467/2001 [2002] OJ L237/3. These two applicants 
therefore decided not to pursue the case, and their names were removed from case T-
306/01 (n 64).
76 Yusuf (n 64) para 115. Further, in para 116, the CFI decided the following: “That inter-
pretation, which is not contrary to the letter of Article 60 EC or Article 301 EC, is justifi ed 
both by considerations of effectiveness and by humanitarian concerns”.
77 Ibid para 115.
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sanctions to be imposed against persons who are not nationals of the 
third country primarily targeted; on the other, it enables the stretching 
of Community competence to cover EU citizens. The Union and Com-
munity competences were, in a sense, determined by the content of the 
SC resolutions, and the Union decided to go beyond what the Treaty text 
provides rather than leave implementation to the Member States. Allow-
ing targeted economic sanctions against EU nationals and stretching the 
scope of EC articles on economic sanctions against them could be prob-
lematic, however. First of all, it is questionable whether allowing targeted 
economic sanctions against EU citizens does not actually represent an 
amendment to the Treaty, which the Court explicitly prohibited in its 
Opinion 2/94, stating that Article 308 EC “cannot be used as a basis 
for the adoption of provisions whose effect would, in substance, be to 
amend the Treaty without following the procedure which it provides for 
that purpose”.78 As the law stands at the present moment, sanctions may 
be adopted against third countries and - presumably, as argued above 
- against nationals of third countries. We are not arguing here that the 
Community should not, in the future, possess such a competence; we 
must warn, however, that any such purely judicially-driven competence 
could be problematic. Second, the CFI’s reasoning could potentially raise 
another diffi cult question: namely, whether the Community has acquired 
the power to impose targeted economic sanctions against EU citizens in 
general, or only together with sanctions against third-country nationals. 
The adoption of sanctions based on Articles 60 and 301 EC would imply 
the latter, as would the CFI’s reference to the fact that individuals must 
be “connected” with the regime targeted by the sanctions. Yet a broad 
(and purposeful) interpretation of the Court’s position could well lead to 
a general competence for adopting sanctions against EU nationals.
It should be stressed that, by not giving the EU the power to freeze its 
citizens’ assets, this competence would be unreasonably split among the 
Member States and the Union, with the former having the power to freeze 
assets of EU citizens, and the latter to freeze assets of other individu-
als outside the EU. In such a case, of course, it would be better for the 
Member States to freeze all the assets themselves; yet this would cause 
an unnecessary particularisation of competence, whereby SC resolutions 
would be implemented by the Union on one occasion, and on another by 
the Member States. Moreover, if a Member State did not implement the 
resolution properly, it could create a safe haven for fi nancing terrorist 
organisations and make European citizenship a shield against sanctions. 
Again, the text of the Constitutional Treaty, which does not seem to re-
strict sanctions merely to those against third-country nationals, might 
78 Opinion 2/94 (n 67) para 30.
198 Maja Brkan: Exploring EU Competence in CFSP: Logic or Contradiction?
also be used as a guideline for interpretation and development of the law 
in this area. In any event, allowing the freezing of EU nationals’ assets 
is one step towards stretching Community competences, with the Court 
once again, as so many times in the past,79 showing a willingness to read 
the Treaty expansively.
It should be added that one possibility available to the Court is to 
distinguish between the EU’s competence to adopt acts alone and its 
competence to implement SC resolutions. Broadening competences sole-
ly to enable Member States to comply with SC resolutions could be based 
on their required compliance with international obligations, which would 
be facilitated by adoption of an act at the Community level. Broadening 
the Community’s competences to adopt acts on its own, without any ba-
sis in a SC resolution, would, however, be more problematic.
3 The future of the CFSP
Regarding the degree to which the Member States might, in the fu-
ture, confer their competences to the Union, it is important to discuss the 
future of the CFSP as well. Thinking about this is no easy task, particu-
larly because one needs to avoid falling into the quite easy trap of simply 
transposing the Community method to this policy area. Divisions in the 
foreign policy area are too profound to be overcome by simply introducing 
qualifi ed majority voting, supremacy and direct effect. Such measures 
would need to be supported by a broad political consensus, or else they 
would create even greater divisions among the positions adopted by the 
Member States. This part of the paper will thus examine two possible 
futures in this area: a model that tends more in the direction of “com-
munalising” the CFSP (the collectivity model), and a model that works 
more to enhance fl exibility within the CFSP (the fl exibility model). The 
precondition for both models is political consensus on the basic issues; 
however, there is a difference between them as to how much competence 
the Member States must confer to the Union. In the fl exibility model, the 
Member States will not need to confer their competences any more than 
at present, whereas under the collectivity model a further conferral of 
competence will be required. Both possible models of development also 
correspond to what was mentioned earlier (in the fi rst part of this paper) 
regarding the stages of formation of a political union. The fl exibility model 
means remaining at the synchronisation stage, whereas the collectivity 
model means moving into the harmonisation stage.
79 The most obvious recent example of very broad interpretation of the Treaty is allowing 
the cumulative imposition of a lump sum penalty payment as a sanction against a Member 
State which failed to fulfi l its obligations under the EC Treaty, in case C-304/02 Commis-
sion of the European Communities v French Republic [2005] ECR I-06263.
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3.1 The fl exibility model
The fi rst possibility for increasing the CFSP’s effectiveness is to fol-
low the path of enhanced fl exibility within this policy. While it is true that 
fl exibility is not a direct route towards harmonisation in the CFSP area, 
it might contribute to that end if a group of Member States proceeding 
in this direction were to be joined later by (certain) other Member States 
who had earlier opted out. However, greater fl exibility could also be coun-
terproductive and actually impede harmonisation. We advocate the view 
that it is more desirable to have at least some action by certain states 
than no action at all. Looking back at the table illustrating the stages 
of formation of a political union, we see that enhanced fl exibility means 
remaining within the synchronisation stage. While it may perhaps be 
seen as an elaboration or variation of that stage, this does not mean that 
cooperation has advanced to the harmonisation stage. Greater fl exibility 
can be achieved via two elements: constructive abstention and enhanced 
cooperation.
3.1.1 How constructive is constructive abstention?
The purpose of constructive abstention, as regulated by the TEU, is 
to prevent the occurrence of a deadlock situation in which the Member 
States are unable to proceed with an action in the CFSP area due to the 
opposition of one or more Member States. In theory, constructive ab-
stention - allowing a Member State which abstains from voting not to be 
bound by the Council’s decision, while this decision commits the Union - 
provides for fl exibility and has great potential for resolving disagreements 
among states. In contrast to “regular” abstention, which would not pro-
tect a Member State from the binding nature of a decision, Article 23(1) 
subparagraph 2 TEU allows it to make a formal declaration whereby it is 
not obliged to apply the Union’s decision, although it is obliged to refrain 
from any action likely to confl ict with or impede that decision. Construc-
tive abstention thus seems to be an effective instrument for surmounting 
differences in the Member States’ foreign policies. Despite this theoretical 
potential, however, the reality also indicates certain disadvantages of this 
instrument.
The fi rst disadvantage is its actual effectiveness and use in practice. 
According to Ward, “the possibility of ‘constructive abstention’ has not 
yet been invoked by any Member State”.80 We have verifi ed this state-
ment with the Council’s public information service, which confi rmed that 
80 I Ward, ‘The Challenges of European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Retrospective 
and Prospective’ (2005) 13 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 5, 33, n 
114.
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constructive abstention has indeed not been employed to date.81 In the 
majority of contested issues where collective action by the Member States 
is probably needed the most, use of constructive abstention is less likely, 
or not likely at all. Member States are inclined to protect their vital inter-
ests, prompting them to use a veto rather than constructive abstention.82 
Although constructive abstention theoretically contributes to fl exibility 
in the CFSP area, we would argue that it does not enhance this policy’s 
effectiveness in practice. On the contrary, the rift between disagreeing 
states becomes even more obvious, and is less likely to be surmounted.83 
While the possibility of constructive abstention should be maintained 
in the future, reliance on it should not be expected to provide a solu-
tion to the most contested issues. The question of how to convince the 
Member States to choose constructive abstention over a veto remains 
unanswered.
Second, there have been doubts as to whether a decision adopted 
with one Member State abstaining still bears the same credibility as a de-
cision adopted unanimously.84 Indeed, there can be no doubt that cred-
ibility is not the same in these two cases; the question is whether the 
same degree of credibility should be sought at all. If we allow the pos-
sibility of a Member State’s abstention from a vote, we must accept the 
diminished credibility of such a decision. In these cases credibility yields 
to effectiveness, with the success of such decisions defi nitely outweighing 
their potential lack of credibility.
Third, commentators have expressed fears of “free riding” with re-
gard to fi nancing CFSP actions, with Member States possibly deciding to 
abstain from voting in order to avoid fi nancing a (military or defence) mis-
sion.85 Missiroli points out that “the costs of missions approved through 
‘constructive abstention’ will be borne by the participating countries in 
accordance with their GDP, and not by the Community budget, unless 
81 The response from the public information service on was: “We were checking your ques-
tion to some of our services and effectively, there was no ‘constructive abstention’ in the 
fi eld of CFSP” (Personal e-mail correspondence 5 May 2006).
82 S Vanhoonacker, ‘From Maastricht to Amsterdam: Was it Worth the Journey for CFSP?’ 
(1997) 2 EIPASCOPE 6.
83 Jaeger claims: “Compared to the pre-Amsterdam simple abstention, a grave disadvantage 
of constructive abstention is the introduction of a much more visible split in any foreign 
policy move of the EU”. T Jaeger, ‘Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty of Nice and Flexibil-
ity in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2002) 7 European Foreign Affairs Review 
297, 299.
84 A Missiroli, ‘CFSP, Defence and Flexibility’ (2000) Chaillot Paper 38, Institute for Secu-
rity Studies of WEU <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai38e.pdf> 9: “In fact, much as it 
makes good sense that a reluctant member state may simply refrain from action without 
blocking a sizeable majority of the others, how far can such a ‘consensus minus X’ formula 
be stretched without undermining the credibility of the decision and its implementation?”.
85 Ibid 10.
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the Council decides otherwise”.86 When provisions on fi nancing CFSP ex-
penses are examined more closely, it is seen that this is true only for 
operating expenses concerning military or defence missions, and not for 
general CFSP expenses.
The administrative expenditures of institutions, which are not at is-
sue here, are, in any event, fi nanced from the EC budget.87 According to 
the second sentence of Article 268(2) EC, operating expenses occasioned 
by the implementation of provisions relating to the CFSP may, under the 
conditions set forth in the TEU, be fi nanced from the budget. The TEU 
further specifi es when these expenses should indeed be so fi nanced. Ac-
cording to the fi rst paragraph of Article 28(3) TEU, operating expenses 
arising from implementation of CFSP-related provisions are fi nanced 
from the budget of the European Communities, except for those aris-
ing from operations with military or defence implications, or where the 
Council has unanimously decided otherwise. In such cases where expen-
ditures are not fi nanced from the EC budget, they are, according to the 
second paragraph of Article 28(3) TEU, “charged to the Member States in 
accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council act-
ing unanimously decides otherwise”. However, this paragraph contains 
another exception, one relating directly to constructive abstention:
As for expenditures arising from operations having military or de-
fence implications, Member States whose representatives in the 
Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second 
subparagraph, [i.e. constructive abstention] shall not be obliged to 
contribute to the fi nancing thereof.
As may be seen, the use of constructive abstention with regard to 
military or defence operations can indeed be problematic in terms of their 
fi nancing. Constructive abstention may be used in matters relating to for-
eign policy, as well as in those relating to defence; the latter are fi nanced 
differently from the former. The second paragraph of Article 28(3) TEU 
specifi cally states that Member States which have used the constructive 
abstention option for a particular decision on military or defence mat-
ters are not obliged to contribute to fi nancing such a mission. Thus it is 
true that free riding could occur in military or defence operations, but 
not in foreign policy operations, which are fi nanced from the EC budget. 
The question that follows is whether the possibility of free riding on the 
fi nancing of military or defence operations is great enough for this argu-
ment to stand. In our view, the argument does carry weight in view of 
the importance of military and defence operations, as well as the large 
sums of money they involve. Just to cite one example, the common costs 
86 Ibid.
87 First sentence of art 268(2) EC and art 28(2) TEU.
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of Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina amounted to EUR 71.7 
million.88 However, due to the sensitive nature of this issue, participation 
in a military or defence operation - and consequently its fi nancing - still 
remains a Member State’s own decision. 
Finally, it is debatable whether constructive abstention may be rec-
onciled with Member States’ duty of loyalty and mutual solidarity (Article 
11(2) TEU).89 This provision also stipulates that they “shall refrain from 
any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair 
its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations”. The duty of 
loyalty is an expression and underlying premise of the collectivity model 
(as explained below), where the Union’s interests are set above narrow na-
tional interests. It represents the ideal of the CFSP which is to be strived 
for and the principle that should underpin de lege ferenda, or future legis-
lation. Yet precisely due to its idealistic nature, it is not possible to realise 
this duty in practice, for the time being; and it goes without saying that, 
given the lack of enforcement mechanisms, it is not possible to enforce it. 
Thus, our conclusion is affi rmative: constructive abstention does, strictly 
speaking, run counter to the duty of loyalty. However, this relationship is 
more correctly described as what the law should be than what the law is.
3.1.2 Enhanced cooperation
Compared to constructive abstention, enhanced cooperation, ex-
tended to the CFSP by the Treaty of Nice, perhaps has a more realistic 
potential for practical use. Enhanced cooperation is “aimed at safeguard-
ing the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by as-
serting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene” (Article 
27a TEU). Despite this, enhanced cooperation, however promising, also 
contains several weaknesses.
The fi rst big hindrance to this instrument is that it may only be used 
in relation to implementation of a joint action or common position, not for 
adoption of CFSP acts themselves. As a general rule, the implementation 
of joint actions or common positions is decided on by a qualifi ed majority. 
Enhanced cooperation thus only allows a smaller group of Member States 
- at least eight of them - to proceed with implementation of a decision 
previously adopted unanimously. Second, enhanced cooperation is not 
an instrument which may be used on a regular basis. Article 43a TEU, 
88 This does not include personnel and other costs, which were referenced according to a “costs 
lie where they fall” basis. See G Grevi, D Lynch and A Missiroli, ‘ESDP Operations’ (2005) Insti-
tute for Security Studies of WEU <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf> 7.
89 Article 11(2) TEU: “The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security 
policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”. See also, for ex-
ample, E Shaver Duquette, ‘Will a Constitution for the European Union Make a Difference?’ 
(2004-2005) 1 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 71.
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inserted by the Treaty of Nice, requires that it be “undertaken only as a 
last resort”, when the objectives of such cooperation cannot be achieved 
by regular means. Thus, the occasions on which enhanced cooperation 
is actually used cannot be too numerous. Third, even enhanced coop-
eration could be blocked by a Member State for important declared rea-
sons of national policy. Every instance of enhanced cooperation requires 
the Council’s authorisation. Despite the fact that such authorisation is 
granted by a qualifi ed majority (Article 27e(2) TEU), in the CFSP area the 
Council will still act in accordance with the provisions on QMV (Article 
27c in connection with the second subparagraph of Article 23(2) TEU), 
which allow a Member State “to oppose the adoption of a decision to be 
taken by qualifi ed majority” for reasons of national policy. 
How should enhanced cooperation evolve in the future, so as to con-
tribute to the effectiveness of the CFSP? Its weaknesses would need to be 
overcome, i.e. its use should be allowed not only for implementation, but 
also for CFSP decisions themselves;90 the possibility of vetoing enhanced 
cooperation should be eliminated;91 and use of this option should be stim-
ulated and supported.92 It is true, as Jaeger93 points out, that using this 
type of cooperation for main decisions - and not only implementing ones - 
could lead to the fragmentation of foreign policy. Yet such fragmentation 
is a necessary corollary of the exercise of enhanced cooperation, whose 
essence is that a group of Member States proceeds with a common ac-
tion that the others do not wish to participate in. Such fragmentation is, 
in any case, softened by the requirement of prior authorisation of such 
cooperation by the Council.
The fl exibility model can serve as the forerunner to a subsequent 
collectivity model, or it can exist concurrently with a deepening of the 
collectivity model, as will be discussed below.
90 F Algieri, J Emmanouilidis and C Giering, ‘Flexibility in EU Foreign and Security Pol-
icy’ (2003) Centre for Applied Policy Research and Bertelsmann Foundation, Convention 
Spotlight 2003/2 <http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/spotlight/Spotlight_02-
03_e.pdf>, 2. The same paper also correctly claims (p 4) that “the fact that the fl exibility 
instruments already contained in the treaty have not been extensively utilised in the past 
demonstrates that the present treaty regulations and instruments are insuffi cient”.
91 Ibid.
92 Colino emphasises that practical use of this mechanism has not been encouraged suf-
fi ciently. SM Colino, ‘Towards greater fl exibility or deadlock? The progress of European 
integration since the introduction of enhanced cooperation’ (2004) The Federal Trust for 
Education and Research, Online Paper 24/04 <http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/con-
stitution/24_04.pdf> 3: “[T]he original formulation in the Treaty of Amsterdam was a ‘dead 
letter’, and even the Nice reform does not necessarily provide much more encouragement to 
put this mechanism into practice”.
93 T Jaeger, ‘Enhanced Cooperation in the Treaty of Nice and Flexibility in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy’ (2002) 7 European Foreign Affairs Review 297, 302, citing 
Peers, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy 1999-2000’ (2001) 20 Yearbook of European 
Law 531, 552.
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3.2 The collectivity model
The second possible direction for enhanced effectiveness of the CFSP 
is continuing to deepen the collectivity of CFSP decisions and strength-
ening cooperation, loyalty and solidarity among the Member States by 
introducing concurrent competences and qualifi ed majority voting in this 
area. As mentioned above, on the scale of stages in the formation of a 
political union the collectivity model represents a transition to the har-
monisation stage.
3.2.1 Introducing concurrent competences
It should be stressed at the outset that introducing an exclusive 
competence is not necessary for an effective CFSP, nor is it desirable at 
this stage of the policy’s development. The same does not apply to con-
current competences. However, although introducing concurrent compe-
tences is one of the prerequisites for a more effective CFSP, the decision 
to proceed with it should be taken upon due refl ection, bearing in mind 
what such competences imply. 
Following the introduction of concurrent competences, the Member 
States would, of course, retain their own relations with third states, while 
EU competences would be used when action by all the Member States is 
required, e.g. in times of crisis, the need for humanitarian intervention, 
supervising elections, and the like - any time when collective action rep-
resents an effective response to a crisis. The most important difference 
from the current type of CFSP competence is that the Member States 
would be pre-empted from acting in this area once the Union has acted. 
This could mean that, should the Union adopt acts against terrorism, 
the Member States should refrain from adopting acts in that particular 
area. Moreover, concurrent competences as currently conceived go hand 
in hand with the supremacy of acts adopted at the Community level. Of 
course, it might be argued that supremacy could be excluded in the case 
of the CFSP; but if one or another level of decision-making were not to 
effectively “occupy” this area, would the actual functioning of concurrent 
competences not be impaired?
In order for the Union not to overstep the boundaries of its compe-
tence, the principle of subsidiarity should be adequately reinforced, as 
explained below. The lines in the sand, to borrow an expression from 
Eileen Denza,94 are thus not those between a common and a single for-
eign policy, but between the Member States’ and the Union’s compe-
tences in particular areas. The call for a single foreign policy is, therefore, 
94 E Denza, ‘Lines in the Sand: Between Common Foreign Policy and Single Foreign Policy’ 
in Tridimas and Nebbia (n 57) 259.
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a misguided one. A single foreign policy for the Union would require in-
troducing an exclusive competence, something which, as argued at many 
intervals in this paper, should not happen.
3.2.2 Expanding qualifi ed majority voting
Probably the most important step towards a more effective CFSP 
is the introduction of qualifi ed majority voting for a broader scope of is-
sues in the CFSP area. Currently, unanimity is the general voting rule 
for CFSP actions. As already mentioned above, qualifi ed majority voting 
can only be used in three instances: when adopting joint actions, com-
mon positions, or any other decision on the basis of a common strategy; 
when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or common po-
sition; and when appointing a special representative (Article 23(2) TEU). 
Expansion of QMV could occur in a general manner, with QMV serving as 
the general rule and unanimity as the exception, whereby the safeguard 
allowing decisions to be blocked for important national policy reasons 
would be maintained. Another possibility for expanding QMV, as sug-
gested by Pernice and Thym, would be to defi ne specifi c CFSP areas in 
which QMV would be used, enumerating in detail which issues would 
permit its use.95 
QMV in the CFSP area is another instrument that works very well 
in theory, acting like a magic wand to resolve all disharmony among the 
Member States’ foreign policies. However, in practice the introduction of 
QMV in this area is faced with immense obstacles, and Menon correctly 
cautions that “wishful thinking should not be allowed to blind us to the 
realities of the situation”.96 The introduction of QMV in the CFSP area re-
quires an immense shift in the Member States’ political positions, partic-
ularly among its strongest opponents, France and the United Kingdom.97 
In contrast, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries are more in favour 
of such an approach. Another downside to introducing QMV in this area 
reveals itself in a comparison with fi rst-pillar QMV: in the latter case, a 
Member State that is outvoted can challenge the decision before the ECJ, 
a possibility which is not allowed with regard to the CFSP, as the Court 
does not have jurisdiction in this area. Thirdly, introducing QMV might 
lead to insurmountable divisions among the Member States,98 much 
greater than those created by enhanced cooperation. For the time be-
95 I Pernice and D Thym, ‘A New Institutional Balance for European Foreign Policy?’ (2002) 
7 European Foreign Affairs Review 369, 379f.
96 A Menon, ‘Towards an Effective CFSP: Institutional Proposals’ (2003) Contribution to 
Convention Forum <http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/other/
oth040203_2_en.pdf>, 3.
97 Vanhoonacker (n 82) 6.
98 Menon (n 96) 3.
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ing, strengthened fl exibility in the CFSP area is both more desirable and 
more appropriate than QMV, which would most likely not even be used 
in contested issues. Enhanced fl exibility, rather than the bindingness of 
measures on states which have voted against them, is a more appropri-
ate instrument for such a sensitive area as foreign policy, at least at this 
stage of its development. In the future, however, the introduction of QMV 
will be necessary to enable the CFSP to move ahead towards forming a 
political union and taking a more active role in international politics. The 
Constitutional Treaty indicates a further step in this respect. QMV will 
also be possible when adopting a European decision defi ning a Union 
action or position, based on a proposal made by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs following a specifi c request from the European Council.99
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has attempted to clarify the answer to questions regard-
ing the nature of the second pillar, and to prove that the CFSP can be 
treated as neither an intergovernmental nor a supranational model. By 
demonstrating that the Union possesses convergent competences in the 
CFSP area and explaining the characteristics of this type of competence, 
it has sought to prove that the CFSP is more than just simple cooperation 
among the Member States. In a more general manner, we have tried to set 
forth general criteria as to when a conferral of competence from the mem-
bers of an entity to the entity itself takes place. Furthermore, our purpose 
has been to show that the introduction of an exclusive competence and 
the creation of a single European foreign policy are not necessary in order 
to ensure the CFSP’s effectiveness and further development. The Union 
is still a long way from creating a full political union, and, at this point 
in time, it is doubtful whether such a union is desirable at all.100 It has 
been argued here that if the Union does indeed wish to move forward 
towards the creation of a political union, it should fi rst introduce concur-
rent competences and qualifi ed majority voting in this area. However, 
such steps towards political union should not be mere words in a revised 
version of the treaties; they should be an active, living force that will give 
the Union the ability to react rapidly to crises in the world, contribute to 
world peace, and promote the values of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law. This will not be achieved by merely regulating the technicali-
ties, but rather by a clear, penetrating vision of the Union’s international 
role, one which can be achieved only if differences in national policies are 
overcome by striving for common action, coupled with the awareness that 
99 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe art III-300(2)(b).
100 Verheugen foresees its creation in twenty years. See ‘Verheugen predicts political union 
in 20 years’ <http://www.euobserver.com/9/20941> accessed 20 February 2006.
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only through such common action can the Union make progress in its 
foreign policy and respond to problems abroad. Another direction that the 
Union could take in the second-pillar area is to deepen its fl exibility by 
strengthening enhanced cooperation and stressing the use of construc-
tive abstention. This might not suffi ce in the long run, however, given 
the ever greater need for responses to a wide variety of world problems. 
New demands for action in the foreign policy area also require adjust-
ments within the framework of fi rst-pillar competences. The introduction 
of “smart sanctions” which target individuals by freezing their funds and 
assets has confronted the Union with a new task, requiring adaptation 
of the scope of fi rst-pillar competences. When implementing UN Security 
Council resolutions in these matters, the Community must broaden its 
fi rst-pillar competences in order to successfully respond to such world 
political demands. With regard to further integration in the CFSP area, 
the Union will hopefully fi nd a way to balance the Member States’ desire 
for control over foreign policy issues, on the one hand, and the effective-
ness of its own foreign policy, on the other, so as to play a stronger inter-
national role in the future.
208 Maja Brkan: Exploring EU Competence in CFSP: Logic or Contradiction?
